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Abstract: Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and
non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for
this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and nonhumans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological
characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of
moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.
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Chapman & Huffman (2018) (C & H) argue that attempts to specify human phenotypic traits to
justify ascribing elevated moral status to humans have failed. From personhood to tool use,
including the use of plants for their medicinal properties, each trait alleged to be the
characteristic that justifies viewing humans as “superior” has proved to be shared by other
animals. Conversely, Singer (2009) and others argue that for any putative unique trait (e.g.,
ability to acquire and use natural languages, levels of cognitive ability, and capacity for
empathy), there will be some humans who lack it yet are accorded moral consideration. Thus
the problem seems to be two-sided: to identify human uniqueness that would justify elevated
moral status, the relevant traits identified would need to satisfy three criteria:
1. only modern humans possess the traits at or above some specified level
2. all modern humans possess them
3. the traits are conceptually linked to differential moral status warranting elevated moral
consideration
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As C & H point out, efforts to specify traits meeting the first and second criteria have been
unsuccessful. Attempts to satisfy the third criterion face serious challenges as well. There is no
reason a group judged “superior” with respect to some trait should be entitled to more rights or
freedom from harm. Allen (2006) expresses pessimism about specifying such traits, noting a gap
between “those properties of animals that are part of the scientific consensus, and those to
which ethicists typically appeal in their arguments.”
C & H suggest that rather than focusing on the differences between humans and nonhumans, we should focus on their similarities. Doing so would inform human dietary choices and
teach us about non-human animals. The problem is that candidate characteristics thus far have
either been arbitrary, not unique to humans, not shared by all humans, or not relevant to
ascriptions of differential moral status. Human/non-human similarities run comparable risks,
including arbitrariness and anthropocentric bias.
C & H are right that differences in themselves are value-free, but according moral
significance based on similarity in some trait is not. An alternative approach would be to focus
on the capacity of non-human animals to suffer. Operationalizing “suffering” and the
phenomenology of pain (apart from its biological underpinnings such as nociception or anterior
cingulate cortical activity) scientifically and ethically is a challenge. Until this challenge is met, or
we gain a better understanding of animal cognition, the Precautionary Principle (Birch 2017)
would recommend treating non-humans with dignity and moral consideration. The cost of
incorrectly ascribing moral status seems lower than the cost of incorrectly denying it.
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